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Death on Inland Waters
By STANLEY J. Coox*
M ARITIME case law, like the common law, does not recognize or
sanction a cause of action for wrongful death; hence resort must be
had to a statute in order to find a right of recovery However, each
of the fifty states has a wrongful death statute, and there are two
federal death acts as well. The problem, then, is not one of finding
a statute which alters the harsh rule of the maritime case law, but
of selecting the particular statute which will apply in a given case.
There are three basic situations which require ]udicial selection
of a statute to provide a remedy for maritime wrongful death. In
the first, the choice depends on the relationship which existed between
the decedent and the defendant. In the other two, the locale is the
determining factor. Also, as will be pointed out, there may be an
overlap in which both a federal and a state statute will apply to dif-
ferent aspects of the same case. Since this article is concerned with
only one of these situations, it is appropriate to define and eliminate
the other two.
First, if the decedent was a member of the crew of a vessel and the
suit is against his employer, the controlling statute is the Jones Act.1
This act creates liability of an employer shipowner to his crew for
wrongful death caused by negligence, and, in cases where death is not
instantaneous or substantially contemporaneous with the original in-
jury, provides for survival, to certain heirs of the decedent, of his per-
sonal cause of action for pam and suffering prior to death. It is not
within the scope of this article to explore the ramifications of the
Jones Act. It is relevant, however, to note that, even though a seaman's
death occurs in port, within the territorial waters of one of the states,
the Jones Act is the governing statute and displaces the wrongful death
act of the state.2
Secondly, if the decedent was not a seaman, or if the suit to recover
for a seaman's death is against others than his employer, the locale of
the accident determines the choice of statute. If the death occurs more
than three nautical miles off shore, the controlling statute is the Fed-
* Member, San Francisco Bar.
141 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
2 Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 1965 A.M.C. 1 (1964);
Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38, 1930 A.M.C. 399 (1930).
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eral Death on the High Seas Act,' which, however, is explicitly limited
in its coverage to such off-shore deaths. Thus, there is no federal
wrongful death statute applying to deaths of persons, other than sea-
men, on inland waters, i.e., in harbors, lakes, rivers, or the coastal
waters of a state less than three nautical miles off shore. It is this third
situation which is the subject of this article: deaths on mland waters
in all situations other than seaman versus employer.
In this area it was long ago decided that the essential uniformity of
federal maritime law would not be disturbed by applying the death act
of the state in whose waters the death took place.4 Accordingly, the
federal courts sitting in admiralty looked to the law of the state where
the death had occurred. Until eight years ago it was also generally held
that the adoption of a state death act by courts of admiralty m cases of
maritime death necessarily carried with it such common law concepts
as the requirement that negligence of the defendant must be shown in
order to establish liability and that the contributory negligence of the
decedent would bar all recovery 6
Under maritime law, however, it had become settled that, in cases
of personal injury, a shipowner was not only liable for his negligence,
but was also liable without fault for injury caused by the unseaworti-
ness of his vessel.' The doctrine developed first as to seamen and was
then applied in favor of longshoremen,7 certain types of repairmen,8
and other maritime workers doing work historically done by the crew.9
8 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1964).
4 Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921). "The subject is maritime and
local in character, and the specified modification of or supplement to the rule applied
in admiralty courts, when following the common law, will not work material prejudice
to the characteristic features of the maritime law, nor interfere with the proper harmony
and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations." Id. at 242.
5Contributory negligence was held to bar recovery for maritime death in Nieport
v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 241 F.2d 916, 1957 A.M.C. 1258 (6th Cir. 1957)
(Ohio statute); Curtis v. A. Garcia y Cia, 241 F.2d 30, 1957 A.M.C. 331 (3d Cir. 1957)
(Pa. statute); Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Gulf Ref. Co., 230 F.2d 346, 1956 A.M.C.
527 (5th Cir. 1956) (La. statute); Feige v. Hurley, 89 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1937) (Ky.
statute); Groonstad v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 236 N.Y. 52, 139 N.E. 777 (1923)
(N.Y. statute); Cromartie v. Stone, 194 N.C. 663, 140 S.E. 612 (1927) (N.C. statute);
Roswell v. Grays Harbor Stevedore Co., 138 Wash. 390, 244 Pac. 723 (1926) (Wash.
statute).
6 Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 1944 A.M.C. 1 (1944).
7 Slppmg Co. v. Sieracla, 328 U.S. 85, 1946 A.M.C. 698 (1946).
8 The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 1959 A.M.C. 813 (1959) (a repairman);
Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 1954 A.M.C. 1 (1953) (a carpenter); Crawford
v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 206 F.2d 784, 1953 A.M.C. 1799 (3d Cir. 1953) (a tank cleaner).
9 "Histoncally the work of loading and unloading is the work of the ship's service,
performed until recent times by the crew. Every consideration, therefore, giving rise
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Eight years ago, the Supreme Court was finally faced with the ques-
tion whether there could be strict liability under a state death statute
for death caused by unseaworthnness in the absence of the usual show-
ing of negligence. In The Tungus v. Skovgaard0 a maritime worker
was killed aboard ship in New Jersey waters. A libel for wrongful
death against the shipowner alleging only unseaworthmess as the
ground for recovery was dismissed in the district court on the ground
that a wrongful death action for unseaworthmess would not lie under
the New Jersey Wrongful Death Act." The court added that the ship-
owner owed no duty of exercising ordinary care to provide decedent
with a safe place to work.' 2 The New Jersey act created a cause of
action for death caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, such as
would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the injured person to
recover damages.
The Third Circuit, reversing the district court, held that the New
Jersey statute should be construed to create liability for maritime
death caused by unseaworthmess without negligence.' 3 The Third
Circuit opinion says that each word in the phrase "wrongful act,
neglect or default" has an independent meaning; hence the statute
includes more than negligence. 14 The court stressed the statutory
qualification of "wrongful act, neglect or default" that it must be of
such nature that the decedent could have recovered for personal in-
juries if the accident had not been fatal, because if the decedent had
survived, he could have recovered from the shipowner under maritime
law on the basis of unseaworthmess. 15
In the Supreme Court this judgment was affirmed, but the Court
split into two groups on the reasons for the affirmance. Mr. Justice
Stewart, writing for the Court stated the following:
1. There is no cause of action for wrongful death in the general
maritime law;16
2. Admiralty will apply state death acts to cases of death on
to the liability and shaping its character bespeaks inclusion of men intermediately em-
ployed to do this work, save only that which is relevant to consent as a basis for responsi-
bility." Seas Slnppmg Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 96, 1946 A.M.C. 698, 708 (1945).
10 358 U.S. 588, 1959 A.M.C. 813 (1959).
11 N.J. STATs. Ai-x. § 2A:31-1 (1952).
12 Skovgaard v. The M/V Tungus, 141 F Supp. 653, 1956 A.M.C. 1587 (1956).
23 Skovgaard v. The M/V Tungus, 252 F.2d 14, 1958 A.M.C. 619 (3d Cir. 1957).
14 Id. at 17, 1958 A.M.C. at 622.
15 Skovgaard v. The M/V Tungus, 252 F.2d 13, 18, 1958 A.M.C. 619, 622 (3d Cir.
1957).
16 The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 590, 1959 A.M.C. 813, 815 (1959).
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inland waters, but must look solely to the state law for the basis
of liability;
7
3. In the absence of a state court decision interpreting the
statute as it applies to maritime deaths, the federal court may
decide whether the state statute should be construed (and
would be construed by the state's courts) to incorporate such
admiralty concepts as absolute liability for unseaworthmess; 8
and
4. The decision of the Third Circuit that the New Jersey stat-
ute permitted recovery for unseaworthmess was not clearly erro-
neous, hence its interpretation would be accepted. 1
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for himself, Mr. Cnef Justice Warren,
and Justices Black and Douglas, wrote a separate opmuon 2 stating that
there was no need to "interpret" the state statute or to worry about
whether the state court would construe the statute to incorporate
maritime principles. It was his view that admiralty principles should
be applied to maritime deaths just as they are to maritime injuries,
with the state statute referred to solely for the purpose of creating a
remedy 2'
This opinion seems to ignore the difference between substantive
and procedural law Since maritime case law recognizes no cause of
action for a maritime death, more than mere procedure is involved.
Unless the state statute creates a cause of action (creates liability
where none existed before), no question of "remedy" is even reached.
Traditional concepts of procedural as distinguished from substantive
law seem to be rejected by the flat statement that state law will be
referred to only in order to create a "remedy" and that admiralty pnn-
ciples of substantive law will then be automatically applied. The
Brennan approach has the virtue, if it be a virtue, of simplicity Instead
of worrying about each state statute as it comes in question, and trying
to construe each statute on its own history and wording, Justice Bren-
nan would pause just long enough to be sure there was a state death
statute and then turn to general admiralty principles.
The other landmark case, decided by the Supreme Court at the
same time as Tungus, is United N.Y & N.J Sandy Hook Pilots Asen
v. Haleck.22 This case also involved a shipboard death in New Jersey
17 Id. at 592, 1959 A.M.C. at 816.
18 Id. at 595, 1959 A.M.C. at 819.
29 Id. at 596, 1959 A.M.C. at 820.
20 Id. at 597, 1959 A.M.C. at 820.
21 Id. at 604, 1959 A.M.C. at 824-25.
22 358 U.S. 613, 1959 A.M.C. 588 (1959).
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waters. A diversity case was brought on the law side of a federal dis-
trict court in New York, with the complaint alleging both negligence
and unseaworthness. The district court charged the jury that either
negligence or unseaworthmess would create liability and that any
negligence of the decedent would mitigate the damages, rather than
bar recovery altogether. A jury verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which held that the
New Jersey statute should be construed to incorporate such maritime
principles as comparative negligence and absolute liability for unsea-
worthmess.23
In the Supreme Court the same division again occurred. Justice
Stewart, for the majority, stated that the Second Circuit had correctly
viewed its task as one of interpreting the state statute, and he accepted
the Second Circuit's decision that the New Jersey statute should be
construed in a maritime death case to substitute the maritime rule of
comparative negligence for the common law rule of contributory neg-
ligence. However, the decision was reversed because on the facts of
the case, even under maritime principles, there was no warranty of
seaworthiness to this decedent in the specialized repair work which he
was performing at the time of his death.24
These two cases seem to establish a rule that the admiralty court
cannot simply borrow the state-created "remedy" and then auto-
matically apply admiralty principles, but must look to the statute for
all purposes, including bases of liability, standards of conduct, and the
validity of such defenses as negligence by the decedent. Admiralty
principles and standards of conduct can be applied only if the state
statute can be construed to incorporate and sanction such principles.
That this is the tenor of the decisions is pinpomted by the Brennan
concurring opinion in Tungus insisting that admiralty principles
should apply in all inland waters death cases, remedially supple-
mented by state law 
25
A year later came another Supreme Court case which created a
certain amount of confusion: Goett v. Unon Carbide Corp.26 In that
case a worker was killed aboard ship in West Virginia waters. A libel
in admiralty against the shipowner resulted in findings by the district
court that the shipowner had been negligent and also that the vessel
2 3 Halecla v. United Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n, 251 F.2d 708, 1958 A.M.C. 1056 (2d
Cir. 1958).
24 United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n v. Halecka, 358 U.S. 613, 618,
1959 A.M.C. 588, 592 (1959).
25 The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 597, 1959 A.M.C. 813, 820 (1959).
26 361 U.S. 340, 1960 A.M.C. 550 (1960).
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had been unseaworthy, with a decree for the libelant. On appeal this
was reversed by the Fourth Circuit, holding that there had been
neither negligence nor unseaworthmess, and that the decedent's work
was of such nature that the shipowner owed him no warranty of sea-
worthiness.27
The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, held that, under the
Tungus rule, the basic question was whether the state statute incorpo-
rated common law or admiralty principles in cases of maritime death.28
Since the Fourth Circuit had not made it clear which standards they
thought applied under West Virginia law, the case was remanded to
the circuit court to decide whether West Virginia law adopted com-
mon law or maritime principles in cases of maritime death.
29
However, one of the dissenting opinions and a "note" in this case
created the real confusion. The note by the same four justices who had
differed from the majority in Tungus stated that they joined in this
decision solely under the compulsion of Tungus, but continued to
disagree with the ruling of that case and reserved their position as to
whether it should be overruled. °
The dissenting opinion by Justice Whittaker cast considerable
doubt on the vitality of Tungus.1 In effect, he stated that he thought
the Fourth Circuit had considered the case as one in which admiralty
principles applied, remedially supplemented by the state law In other
words, the state statute created a remedy, but federal maritime prin-
ciples controlled liability Astoishingly enough, Justice Whittaker
went on to say that this is all that Tungus stands for and that he agreed
with Justice Brennan's separate opinion in that case (although he had
voted with the majority in Tungus).
If federal principles remedially supplemented by the state statute
is all that Tungus stands for, it is difficult to understand why Justice
Stewart wrote the majority opinion as he did and why Chief Justice
Warren and Justices Brennan, Black, and Douglas felt it necessary to
present a separate opinion. It is virtually impossible to reconcile Jus-
tice Whittaker's vote in Tungus with his dissent in Goett.
To add to the confusion, at the same time as Goett another case
came before the Supreme Court, Hess v. United States32 That case
2 7 Umon Carbide Corp. v. Goett, 256 F.2d 449, 1959 A.M.C. 124 (4th Cir. 1958).
28 Goett v. Umon Carbide Corp., 361 U.S. 340, 342-43, 1960 A.M.C. 550, 551-52
(1960).
29 Id. at 343-44, 1960 A.M.C. at 552.
o Id. at 344, n.5, 1960 A.M.C. at 553.
31 Id. at 345, 1960 A.M.C. at 554.
82 361 U.S. 314, 1960 A.M.C. 527 (1960).
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involved a death on inland waters of the state of Oregon wich has
two death acts. A general statute creates liability for any wrongful
act or omission resulting in death. An Employers' Liability Law ren-
ders an employer additionally liable for failure to "use every device,
care and precaution which it is practicable to use for the protection
and safety of life and limb ,,33
In Hess the district court had refused to apply the higher standards
of the Oregon Employers' Liability Law because it felt admiralty was
required to use the regular death act and to apply extra requirements
over and above admiralty principles would violate federal admiralty
rules, hence would be unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.34
In the Supreme Court, Justice Stewart, speaking for six members, held
that under Tungus, the defendant's conduct must be measured by
state standards and not by admiralty rules as such. Hence the higher
requirements of the Oregon Employers' Liability Law must be enforced,
no constitutional impediment being perceived.
In Hess the same four justices who had dissented m Tungus
entered a caveat, as they had in Goett, that they joined in the decision
solely under the compulsion of Tungus, but reserved their position as
to whether Tungus should be overruled.-5 Harlan and Frankfurter
dissented 0 because they felt the application of the Oregon statute was
unconstitutional in that it imposed greater liability than the maritime
law. Justice Whittaker, in a separate memorandum opMion, 7 said, as
he had m Goett, that he considered that federal maritime principles
applied remedially supplemented by the state statute. He therefore
agreed that the additional requirements of the state law were uncon-
stitutional because they upset the necessary nation-wide uniformity of
admiralty principles.
At this stage, then, the four justices continued to disapprove the
decision in Tungus and to reserve the right to overrule it, while Jus-
tice Whittaker seemed to have resigned from the Tungus majority and
]omed the dissenters. Since then, Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker
have been replaced by Justices White and Fortas, whose views are not
not yet known. Considering the attitude originally evinced by Bren-
nan, Black, Douglas and Warren, it is entirely possible that Tungus
will some day be overruled, and the Court will decide that federal
maritime principles automatically apply to state maritime deaths in
33 OnE. 11Ev. STAT. § 654.305 (1965).
34 259 F.2d 285, 1958 A.M.C. 2057 (1958).
35 Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314, 321-22, 1960 A.M.C. 527, 534 (1960).
36Id. at 322, 1960 A.M.C. at 535.
37 Id. at 339, 1960 A.M.C. at 549.
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territorial waters, with no need to decide whether the state statute can
or should be construed to "incorporate" maritime principles. That the
issue has not been re-examined and expressly ruled upon again is
perhaps explained by the fact that, as will be pointed out, most of
the post-Tungus decisions have construed state statutes to incorporate
maritime principles.
The statutes of the various states differ in wording and an mterpre-
tation in favor of incorporating maritime principles is easier in some
cases than others.8 8 In a few states, for example, Virgima,
9 Maryland, 40
Mississippi, 41 Florida42 and Oregon, 4 the statute speaks in terms of
admiralty remedies or principles. Both Virginia 4 and Maryland 45
create liability in rem against a vessel. This is a purely admiralty con-
cept, hence it is strongly arguable that the legislatures of these states
had maritime law in mind and intended admiralty principles to apply
to maritime deaths.
Statutes of other states refer to a wrongful act, neglect or default
such as would have entitled the decedent to recover for personal in-
juries if he had survived. Since an injured man can recover from the
shipowner for unseaworthmess without "fault," and his own negli-
gence would reduce but not bar recovery, it is again strongly arguable
that liability for death is determined by the same maritime principles
which would have applied had the man been injured instead of killed.
Examples of this type of statute are those of New Jersey,4" Ohio4'
and Maine.48
A third group of statutes consists of those which merely create
liability for wrongful act, neglect or default. Examples are Washing-
ton49 and Califorma.50 This wording does not, on its face, give any
indication that the legislature had maritime law in mind, but, as will
3 8 A list of state death acts, together with an attempt at classifynmg some of them,
can be found m Judge Brown's dissenting opmion m Emerson v. Holloway Concrete
Products Co., 282 F.2d 271, 285 (5th Cir. 1960).
39 CODE OF VA. § 8-633 (Supp. 1966).
4 0 ANN. CODE Mn., Art. 67, § 1 (1957).
412 Miss. CODE § 1565 (1942).
42 FLA. STATS. ANN. § 768.01 (1964).
43 Oni. REV. STAT. § 783.010 (1965). See also ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 30.010-30.100
(1965).
44 See statute cited note 39 supra.
45 See statute cited note 40 supra.
46 N.J. STATS. ANNi. § 2A.31-1 (1952).
47PAGE'S OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (1954).
4 8 ME. REv. STATS. ANN., Title 18, § 2551 (1954).
49 REv. CODE OF WAsH., Title 4, § 4.20.010 (1965 Supp.).
50 CAL. CODE Civ. Pnoc. § 377 ("wrongful act or neglect").
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be pointed out, this does not present a very serious obstacle to a
maritime interpretation.
Liability for Unseaworthiness
On the question of incorporating the maritime rule of liability
without fault for unseaworthmess, the decisions are overwhelmingly
in favor of liability under state wrongful death statutes of all types.
There are only three cases denying liability- Emerson v. Holloway,Si
Graham v. A. Lust, Ltd.52 and Lee v. Pure Oil Co.3
Lee was decided before Tungus, and was based on two grounds:
one that there was no liability for unseaworthmess and the other that,
even under admiralty principles, no warranty of seaworthiness was
owed to the decedent, who was a shore employee delivering baked
goods to a vessel. Graham was also decided before Tungus, and did
not consider or use the approach of that case. Emerson was decided
after Tungus, with a strong dissent by Judge Brown, but was based on
a narrow ground which had also been put in doubt by another Su-
preme Court decision.
The Emerson court held that, under Florida law, the decedent had
been a licensee, not an invitee, hence no general duty of care was
owed to him under the state law However, insofar as Emerson is
based on state law distinguishing between classes of visitors as licens-
ees or invitees (or social guests versus business guests), its authority
has been somewhat weakened by Kermarec v. Compagme Generale
Transatlantique." In Kermarec the lower court applied state law to
determine the extent of the duty owed by a shipowner to a non-busi-
ness visitor (social guest of a member of the crew of a merchant ves-
sel) who was injured while aboard. The Supreme Court, however, dis-
carded the common law classifications between licensee and invitee,
holding that the maritime law required a shipowner to use reasonable
care toward all persons lawfully coming aboard and that this principle
must be uniformly applied throughout the admiralty jurisdiction, to
the exclusion of state law distinctions between various kinds of visitors.
It should be noted, however, that Kermarec involved injury, not death;
hence it is not completely at odds with the Fifth Circuit's approach
in Emerson, where a death was involved and the state statute was
admittedly the only source of a cause of action.
51282 F.2d 271, 1961 A.M.C. 1484 (5th Cir. 1960) (Fla. statute).
52206 F.2d 223, 1953 A.M.C. 2161 (5th Cir. 1953) (Fla. statute).
0 218 F.2d 711, 1955 A.M.C. 820 (6th Cir. 1955) (Tenn. statute).
54 358 U.S. 625, 1959 A.M.C. 597 (1959).
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A more serious objection to Emerson is that the Florida statute
there under consideration provided that, in the event of death by
wrongful act, neglect, carelessness or default of any vessel or person
thereon, the vessel would be liable in rem. 5 Arguably, such use of
maritume terms and the granting of the admiralty remedy of suit in
rem against the vessel indicates that the Florida legislature intended
maritime principles to apply Despite these weaknesses in the majority
opinion in Emerson, the Supreme Court dened certiorari."6
All other decisions since Tungus have held that the state statute
should be construed to incorporate the maritime rule of a shipowner's
absolute liability for unseaworthmess, regardless of negligence.
5
7
So far as the author's research has gone, only one state has a statute
which can hardly be construed to create a cause of action for death by
unseaworthmess without negligence. The Pennsylvama wrongful
death statute provides for recovery where death was caused by "un-
lawful violence or negligence."5 8 Such words as "neglect" or "default"
are not used, nor is there any reference to admiralty remedies. Unless
the approach of the minority in Tungus (maritime law remedially
supplemented by the state statute) becomes the majority rule, it is
difficult to see how this Pennsylvania statute can be "interpreted" to
create a cause of action for unseaworthmess without negligence.
59
Contributory Negligence
When the issue is the effect of the decedent's own negligence, the
trend of the decisions is again toward the maritime Interpretation. 60
55 FLA. STAT. § 768.01 (1959).
56 364 U.S. 941 (1960).
57 Compama Transatlantica v. International Shipping Agency, 358 F.2d 209 (1st
Cir. 1966) (Puerto Rico statute); Curry v. Fred Olsen Line, 367 F.2d 921 (9th Cir.
1966) (Cal. statute); Cunningham v. Redieret Vindeggen, 333 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1964)
(N.Y. statute); Union Carbide v. Goett, 278 F.2d 319 (4th Cir. 1960) (W Va. statute);
Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield, 269 F.2d 317, 1959 A.M.C. 2189 (4th Cir. 1959) (Va.
statute); Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Service, 235 F Supp. 97 (W.D. La. 1964) (La.
statute); State v. Nabella, 176 F Supp. 668 (D. Md. 1959) (Md. statute); Clark v.
Iceland S.S. Co., 179 N.Y.S.2d 708, 715 (1958) (N.Y. statute).
5 8 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1601.
59 The fullest discussions and the best illustrations of the modem approach to this
problem of interpreting the state statute will be found in Compania Transatlantica v.
Melendez Torres Agency, 358 F.2d 209 (1st Cir. 1966), and Curry v. Fred Olsen Line,
367 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1966).
60 See Curry v. Fred Olsen Line, supra note 59; Olson v. New York Cent. R.R., 341
F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1965) (N.Y. statute); Anthony v. International Paper Co., 289 F.2d
574 (4th Cir. 1961) (S.C. statute); Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield, 269 F.2d 317,
1959 A.M.C. 2189 (4th Cir. 1959) (Va. statute); The Devona, 1 F.2d 482 (D. Me.
1924) (a pre-Tungus decision using comparative negligence under the Maine statute);
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One reason for this is that where there is no state court decision mter-
preting the state statute in a maritime death case, the federal courts
are free to make their own guess as to how the state court would
construe the statute and can decide that the state court would prob-
ably interpret its statute to incorporate maritime principles. In fact,
since 1958 only two cases, state or federal, have held the decedent's
contributory negligence in a maritime death case to be a complete bar.
One is Byrd v. Belcher," a district court case which does not cite or
discuss Tungus or Haleckt. The other is a Kentucky decision, Gregory
v. Paducah Midstream Serv.6 2 m which the Kentucky Court of Appeals
cites Tungus for the rule that the state law controls and Goett for the
rule that the state is free to decide for itself whether to apply land or
maritime principles to a death on iland waters. It then concludes
that the Kentucky common law bar for the decedent's contributory
negligence applies to maritime deaths.
Where the highest state court has actually ruled on the precise
issue of the effect of the decedent's negligence in maritime death cases,
however, it is difficult to see how a federal court, looking to the state
law alone as required by Tungus and Haleckz, can venture to guess
or predict that the state court if faced with the issue again, would
overrule its earlier decision and switch to a maritime interpretation.
In at least two cases decided before 1958,63 the highest court of a
state interpreted its state death act to bar all recovery for a maritime
death if the decedenfs negligence contributed to the death. Although
those cases were decided before 1958, and did not approach the prob-
lem in the light of the considerations stressed in Tungus and Haleckz,
still they are decisions of the state court as to the effect of the state
statute on a maritime death and are presumably binding on a federal
court.6 4
The modem trend toward a "maritime interpretation" is illustrated
by the history of the interpretation of the wrongful death statutes of
two states. Under the Texas Wrongful Death Act contributory negli-
gence was held to bar recovery for a maritime death in Truelson v.
Wright v. Cion Corp. Peruna Desvaspores, 171 F Supp. 735, 1959 A.M.C. 2505
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) (N.J. & Del. statutes); Vassallo v. Nederl-Amerik Stoomv Maats Hol-
land, 162 Tex. 52, 344 S.W.2d 421 (1961) (Tex. statute).
61 203 F Supp. 645 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
62 401 S.W.2d 40, 1966 A.M.C. 2008 (Ky. 1966).
63 Cromartie v. Stone, 194 N.C. 663, 140 S.E. 612 (1927); Roswall v. Grays Harbor
Stevedore Co., 138 Wash. 390, 244 Pac. 723 (1926).
64 Those federal cases cited supra m note 5, which applied the common law rule of
contributory negligence, were also decided before Tungus and Haleckl and are now of
doubtful authority.
May, 1967]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Whitney & Bodden Shipping Co.,65 with no discussion thought neces-
sary The same ruling was again made under the Texas statute (it was
conceded by both parties that contributory negligence would bar
recovery) in Graff v. Parker Bros. & Co. 66 This interpretation was ac-
cepted by an intermediate appellate court of the state in Vassallo v.
Nederl-Amerik Stoomv Maats Holland 7 where the Texas Court of
Civil Appeals cited Tungus and Halecks for the rule that state law con-
trols and held that contributory negligence was a complete bar to
recovery for a maritime death under the Texas statute. The opinon
points out that the statute had been enacted long ago, before the pres-
ent liberal maritime rules were adopted, and that five different bills
in the state legislature to adopt the rule of comparative negligence
had been defeated.
On further appeal, however, the Texas Supreme Court reversed
the intermediate court and held that the Texas statute should be inter-
preted to incorporate the maritime rule of comparative negligence for
a maritime death,68 citing The Devona,6 9 Holley v. The Manfred
Stansfield"0 and Wright v. Cion Corp. Peruna Desvaspores71
The history of the Califorma statute also presents a steady change.
In Mortenson v. Pacific Far East Line72 a libel for wrongful death in
California waters contained one count charging unseaworthmess. This
was dismissed on motion, on a holding that the state statute created no
liability for non-negligent unseaworthmess.
Later, in Aldridge v. States Marine Corp73 the question of contrib-
utory negligence in a maritime death case under the Califorma statute
was considered. The district court had dismissed the complaint on
the ground that contributory negligence of the decedent appeared on
the face of the complaint, and contributory negligence was a complete
defense under the California statute. This was reversed by the Ninth
Circuit, but not upon a contrary interpretation of the statute. Instead,
the holding was simply that a dismissal upon motion was premature
because the jury might find decedent was not negligent, the issues
might be changed by amendments to pleadings or by pretrial order,
65 10 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1925).
66204 F.2d 705, 1953 A.M.C. 2166 (5th Cir. 1953).
67 337 S.W.2d 309, 1960 A.M.C. 1632 (1960).
68 Vassallo v. Nederl-Amerik Stoomv Maats Holland, 162 Tex. 52, 344 S.W.2d 421
(1961).
69 1 F.2d 482 (D. Me. 1924).
70262 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1961).
71 171 F Supp. 735, 1959 A.M.C. 2505 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
72 148 F Supp. 71, 1956 A.M.C. 2275 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
73265 F.2d 554, 1959 A.M.C. 1401 (9th Cir. 1959).
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and by the time the case came to trial the California courts might rule
on the issues. In short, Aldridge evaded a decision on the interpreta-
tion of the California statute and contented itself with pointing out
that the state court might decide that the law for wrongful death
should be uniform in the state, whether occurring on shore or on the
water, or might decide that the law should be uniform for maritime
torts whether they resulted in injury or death.
Finally the issue was squarely presented in Curry v. Fred Olsen
Line,74 and the Ninth Circuit had to interpret the California statute.
The case is interesting in several respects.
First, in Curry the complaint alleged both unseaworthness and
negligence, in separate counts. The district court granted a summary
judgment to the defendant on the unseaworthmess count and the case
was tried on the negligence count, resulting in a verdict for the de-
fendant. The plaintiff appealed, assigning only the dismissal of the
unseaworthnmess count as error and not contesting the judgment on
the negligence count. The Califorma wrongful death statute75 refers
only to death caused by wrongful act or neglect. It does not use the
word "default," and it does not mention such maritime concepts as
liability of a ship. Nor does it refer to an act or neglect such that the
decedent could have recovered for injuries had he lived. The Ninth
Circuit nevertheless held that the California Supreme Court, which
had pioneered in absolute liability for defective products, would con-
strue the state death act to create liability for unseaworthiness with-
out negligence.76
Secondly, in Curry the jury found, in answer to a special interroga-
tory, that the decedent had been contributorily negligent. Appellant
shipowner argued that, even if unseaworthmess were a ground of
liability, the decedenfs contributory negligence should bar recovery
in an event, citing the Califorma Supreme Court case of Buckley v.
Chadwzck 7 7 which held expressly that the decedent's contributory
negligence was a complete bar to recovery for wrongful death. The
Ninth Circuit, however, distinguished Buckley on the ground that
there the basis of liability was the defendant's negligence. Therefore
all it stood for was a rule that decedent's contributory negligence is
a defense to an action for wrongful death based on negligence. Since
the federal rule in unseaworthmess cases is that decedent's negli-
gence merely mitigates damages, the Ninth Circuit held that the
't 367 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1966).
75 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 377.
76 Curry v. Fred Olsen Line, 367 F.2d 921, 926 (9th Cir. 1966).
77 45 Cal. 2d 183, 289 P.2d 242 (1955).
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California courts would follow this same rule under similar circum-
stances. It said, at the conclusion of its opinion:
Negligence is an established concept of the common law, and
it is not surprising that state courts apply the common law defense
of contributory negligence in such cases. Unseaworthmess, on the
other hand, is an admiralty concept, and it seems to us that, once
a state applies its wrongful death statute to such a cause of action,
it is probable that it will also apply the admiralty concept as to the
defense of contributory negligence. 78
Curry seems to concede that, even in a maritime death case, un-
der California law the decedent's contributory negligence will bar
any recovery for the defendant's negligence. Its holding is that the
California courts would adopt the maritime concept of strict liability
for unseaworthmess and then accordingly adopt the maritime rule
that the decedents negligence only mitigates the damages in the
case of death from unseaworthmess.
In the light of the holding that the California court would adopt
admiralty principles to measure the conduct of both parties in an un-
seaworthiness case, the Curry decision is rather illogical in suggesting,
and apparently conceding, that contributory negligence will still be a
complete defense in a negligence case. Under the maritime law the
plaintiff's negligence is never a complete defense. Regardless of
whether the defendant is liable for negligence or unseaworthmess, in
admiralty the injured plaintiffs negligence merely reduces the dam-
ages proportionately to the degree of his fault. If the California
courts would (as the Ninth Circuit says) adopt the maritime principle
of unseaworthmess in interpreting the state death act, why would
they refuse to adopt the maritime rule of comparative negligence for
all other maritime torts resulting in death?
The wording of the Curry opinion leads to a strange result indeed.
Negligence is always blameworthy, while liability for unseaworthnness
without "fault" (without negligence or intentional wrongdoing) finds
its only justification in the social desirability of protecting the victims
of maritime industrial accidents. Under Curry, if the decedent was
guilty of negligence, the negligent snpowner escapes all liability,
while the owner whose vessel was unseaworthy without his knowl-
edge, participation or fault is liable for some percentage of the total
damages. If different principles are to apply to the two situations,
elementary notions of fair play and justice would seem to dictate that
78 367 F.2d at 929-30.
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the two rules should be reversed. That is, the decedent's negligence
should bar recovery for unseaworthmess without fault, but should
only mitigate damages where the defendant was negligent.
The Curry decision seems to create a curious situation in which the
defendant shipowner mght find it advisable to argue strongly that he
was negligent, so that the decedent's negligence would bar all re-
covery Conversely, where the decedent's own negligence is pretty
clear, the plaintiff will want to argue that the defendant was not negli-
gent in any way, and should beware of even alleging negligencel
This would be bad enough in a case where potential negligence and
potential unseaworthmess are separate factors, with a choice pre-
sented as to causation. What happens m a case where the negligence
and the unseaworthmess relate to the same causative factor?
Suppose, for example, that a longshoreman employed by a steve-
dore company is killed when he continues to use a ship's winch which
he knows, from operating it himself, is defective and dangerous.
Suppose also that the master and bosun of the ship know that the
winch is dangerously defective and have failed to do anything to have
it repaired, although they were told by the owner to have it fixed and
had ample time to do so before its use began.
The shipowner's employees were negligent in regard to the winch.
Is the winchdriver's negligence a complete bar? The winch was defec-
tive, and the shipowner would be liable for such unseaworthmess
even in the absence of negligence. Without negligence, this liability
is reduced in amount, but not defeated, by the winchdriver's negli-
gence, says the Curry decision. But there was negligence of the
shipowner in allowing the winch to remain defective and allowing
it to be used. Which rule applies-contributory negligence or com-
parative negligence? Curry creates the problem, but does not solve it.
The solution remains to be stated in some other case when the issue is
squarely presented.
Miscellaneous Rules
Since the basic approach to deaths on inland waters remains one
of the federal court applying state law, several admiralty principles
sometimes fall by the wayside.
One example is the question of a vesse's liability in rem. In an
injury case founded on maritime law the ship is liable in rem as a
routine matter of admiralty remedies. When a state death act is the
foundation of liability, an admiralty action against the ship in rem
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will lie only where the state statute creates such liability In Andrade
v. United States79 it was held that there was no in rem liability under
the Rhode Island statute because the statute granted no such remedy
In State v. A/S Nye Kristianborg" the Maryland statute had been
amended, after the death there concerned, to grant a remedy m rem
against an offending vessel. The court held that this amendment could
not be given a retroactive effect and therefore dismissed the in rem
cause of action, citing a number of cases.
While these last two cases were decided before Tungus and
Halecki, their reasoning is not weakened thereby, since the extraor-
dinary remedy of a suit against a vessel in rem cannot easily be
"construed" into a statute which creates personal liability and says
nothing about other remedies.
Admiralty rules governing time for suit are also superseded by
state law in cases of death on inland waters. There is no statute of
limitations in admiralty for maritime injury suits. The timeliness
of suit is measured by the doctrine of laches, or unreasonable delay 8'
While the admiralty court will take into consideration the statute of
limitations of the state wherein it sits, an admiralty suit filed after
the state statute has run will still be allowed if the libelant shows
some excuse for his delay and if the respondent has not been preju-
diced by the delay 82 In a death case, however, it is the state statute
which creates the cause of action, and the state statute of limitations
must be applied. The leading case is Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia,83
where the Supreme Court pointed out that it must look to state law
in an inland waters death case and held a suit under the California
statute to be barred because it was not filed until sixteen days after the
California one year limitation period had expired.
The Garcia rationale has been extended to questions of timeliness
in suits brought under the Suits in Admiralty Act84 and the Public
Vessels Act85 under which the United States has waived its govern-
mental immunity for the torts of its vessels. Though these statutes
fix a two year limitation period within which suits against the gov-
ernment must be filed, the Fifth Circuit in Melia v. United States8
79 107 F Supp. 463, 1952 A.M.C. 1960 (D.R.I. 1952).
80 84 F Supp. 775, 1949 A.M.C. 1329 (D. Md. 1949).
81 GIMoRE & BLAck, ADMmIATY 296, 298 (1957).
8 2 GIMORE & BLAcK, ADrmALTa 630 (1957).
83 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
8441 Stat. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1964).
85 43 Stat. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-90 (1964).
86 152 F.2d 686, 1946 A.M.C. 84 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 992 (1952).
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held that the timeliness of a suit for wrongful death brought against
the Government was necessarily governed by state law An Army
tug had collided with a yacht in Louisiana waters and an occupant
of the yacht was killed. The Louisiana one year statute was held to
bar the suit filed sixteen months after the death.
A smilar result was reached in Allen v. United StatesS7 even
though the state limitation period was not expressed as an integral
part of the state death act. A libel for wrongful death in California
waters was filed under the Public Vessels Act and Suits in Admiralty
Act within the two year period, but more than one year after the
death. California has only a general one year statute of limitations for
death and personal injury actions. The libelant argued that the two
year limitation of the federal statute applied and that the California
statute of limitation was merely a limitation on the remedy rather
than on the substantive cause of action, and hence not controlling.
The Ninth Circuit rejected both arguments and affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the action because of the one year bar of the state
statute. The opimon points out that Tungus and the other Supreme
Court decisions require the federal court to look to state law in the
inland waters death situation and rejected the two year period of the
federal statutes just as the Fifth Circuit did in Mefia v. United States.8
As to the argument that the California statute created a limitation on
the remedy, not the right, the Ninth Circuit held that it must accept
state law as an integrated whole, and since the state limitation law
"significantly affects" the results of litigation and is more than merely
procedural, it must be applied in the admiralty court.
The admiralty rule that the absence of a vessel from the jurisdic-
tion excuses a delay in suing also yields to state law In Continental
Cas. Co. v. The Benny Skou89 a longshoreman was killed aboard ship
in Virginia waters and the ship sailed the next day It did not return
to that jurisdiction for several years. Immediately upon its return it
was libeled in rem and seized under the Virgina death statute which
allows a suit in rem. The Fourth Circuit held, however, that the
necessary resort to state law obligated it to apply the Virginia one year
statute of limitations, which was contained in the statute creating the
liability
State law has been held applicable in several other situations.
For example, the language of the statute may limit the persons en-
87 338 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1964).
88 152 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 862 (1946).
89 200 F.2d 246, 1953 A.M.C. 109 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 992 (1952).
May, 1967] DEATH ON INLAND WATERS
titled to recover for the wrongful death of the decedent. In Dobrrn v.
Mallory S.S. CoY0 a longshoreman killed on a ship in Seattle left no
wife or children, but had parents in Ireland. The Washington statute
created a cause of action for wrongful death in favor of surviving
spouses and children or, if there were no spouse or children, in favor
of parents living in the United States at the time of the death. Apply-
ing this state law, the federal court held that the parents in Ireland
had no cause of action.
In re Nueces County, Texas, Road Dist. No. 491 presents another
example of the application of state law in an inland waters death
problem. A ferryboat operated by a Texas governmental district was
involved in an accident causing injury and death. The district filed
a petition in admiralty to limit its liability to the value of the boat
under the Federal Limitation of Liability Act.92 The district thus
invoked federal law and submitted itself to the ]unsdiction of the
federal admiralty court. The court pointed out that under Texas law
a state governmental subdivision or agency is immune from tort
liability, and that the statute creating this district expressly provided
that it should not be liable for tort. The court then distinguished
between the death clamis and the injury claims. Since the injury
claims arose under federal maritime law, the district was held liable
under established admiralty law n spite of the Texas law As to the
death claims, however, liability was denied because state law con-
trolled for deaths n the inland' waters of Texas.
The question of survival is the last aspect which should be con-
sidered briefly Many states have a "survival statute" as well as a
"death statute." The latter creates a new cause of action for designated
surviving heirs; the former provides for survival to certain heirs of
the decedent's own cause of action for pain and suffering before death,
in cases where death was not substantially contemporaneous with the
tort. A true survival statute, where the facts allow it to operate, may
create at least a partial cause of action, and may even supplement a
true death cause of action.
Curtis v. Garcia y Cia93 involved a death on the waters of Penn-
sylvama, which had both a true death act and a survival statute. The
plaintiff sued under both statutes and the district court found con-
tributory negligence by the decedent. It therefore demed recovery
902 98 Fed. 349 (E.D.N.Y. 1924).
91174 F Supp. 846 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
D9249 Stat. 960 (1935), 46 U.S.C. §§ 183-86 (1964).
03 241 F.2d 30, 1957 A.M.C. 331 (3d Cir. 1957).
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under the death act, applying state law, but allowed recovery under
the survival statute, since the decedent's cause of action for injury
would arise under admiralty law, with its rule of comparative negli-
gence, and this maritime cause of action survived to the widow under
the state survival statute.
Even in cases where another statute applies to cases of wrongful
death the state survival statute may be invoked as a substitute for,
or a supplement to, that other statute. At the beginning of this article
Gillespie v. United States Steel CorpY4 was cited for the rule that for
the death of a seaman, the rights of his heirs are determined by the
Jones Act to the exclusion of a state death act. In Gillespie the seaman
died in Ohio waters. The suit alleged negligence of the shipowner
under the Jones Act and unseaworthmess under the Ohio wrongful
death act and also asked for damages for decedent's pam and suffering
under the Ohio survival statute. The district court held the Jones
Act to be the exclusive remedy and struck the allegations mvokmg
Ohio statutes. The Supreme Court agreed that, insofar as a cause of
action for a seaman's wrongful death was concerned, the Jones Act
displaced the state statute. Since the Jones Act speaks solely in terms
of the shipowner's negligence, there could be no cause of action for
unseaworthmess. The Jones Act also provides for survival of the
decedent's own cause of action based on negligence. This part of the
federal statute was held not to be exclusive, the Supreme Court hold-
mg that the decedent's cause of action for unseaworthmess under
general maritime law would survive under the state survival statute,
citing its own dictum to that effect in Kernan v. American Dredg-
ing Co."5
In Holland v. Steag, Inc.5 the court likewise held that the Jones
Act was the exclusive remedy, hence negligence must be alleged and
proved, but that the survival statute of Massachusetts could be in-
voked if death were not substantially contemporaneous with the
casualty It is of interest that in Holland the death occurred on the
high seas, but the Massachusetts survival statute was held applicable
because the boat was owned by a Massachusetts corporation.
In Abbott v. United States97 the death occurred on the high seas
and the suit was not by the seaman's heirs against his employer. The
applicable statute was therefore held to be the Federal Death on the
94379 U.S. 148 (1964).
95355 U.S. 426, 1958 A.M.C. 251 (1958).
90 143 F Supp. 203, 1956 A.M.C. 1834 (D. Mass. 1956).
97207 F Supp. 468, 1962 A.M.C. 2350 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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High Seas Act,9 which has no survival feature. The court held that
a state survival statute could be invoked for decedent's pamn and
suffering before death, since the federal act had not preempted the
entire field. It therefore applied the survival statute of the tort-feasor's
domicile.
Just v. Chambers99 involved personal injuries in Florida waters,
followed by the death of the tort-feasor. It was held unnecessary to
decide whether tort causes of action survived the death of the tort-
feasor under admiralty law, since the state statute providing for survival
of liability despite the death of the tort-feasor would be applied by
the admiralty courts. The accident occurred in Florida waters and
the tort-feasor was a Florida resident, hence the Florida law was
applied. If the tort-feasor was domiciled in state A and the tort was
committed in state B, presumably the law of state A, the domicile,
would control, but this precise question has not yet been decided.
Conclusion
In numerous cases it has been well settled that maritime torts are
governed by the federal maritime law Even where suit is filed in a
state court, the latter must ascertain and apply the substantive law of
admiralty The same rule applies to a death on inland waters, but,
as we have seen, the maritime law says that the state law is the only
source of a right to recover. In an inland death case, then, the state
court which looks for guidance to the maritime law finds itself, by a
sort of "renvoi," thrown back upon its own resources.
One practical factor is apparent from the decisions: the plaintiff
seeking recovery for a death on inland waters is perhaps better off
if suit is brought in the federal court. If there is a state court decision
squarely in point on such things as unseaworthmess without fault
or comparative versus contributory negligence, it will be controlling
in any court. In the absence of such a state court decision, the federal
courts today seem disposed to conclude that the state court would
construe the state statute to incorporate maritime principles.
The selection of the federal forum is, of course, virtually manda-
tory from plaintiff's standpoint where the courts of the particular
state have not decided whether the state statute does or does not
incorporate maritime principles, but the federal court in that state
has decided that the statute should be construed to do so. The federal
court will presumably continue to use its interpretation of the statute.
98 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § § 762-68 (1964).
99 312 U.S. 383, 1941 A.M.C. 430 (1941).
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The state court is, by definition, the final and chief arbiter as to the
meaning of the state's statutes, and the state court might decide to
stick to common law principles, as it is free to do if it so chooses.
Unless there is a diversity of citizenship to sustain jurisdiction on
the law side, such an action in the federal court must be filed in
admiralty, where no jury is available. This is a very small price to pay
for insurance that maritime principles will be applied.
I
